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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS PROVIDING
FOR FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW SELECTION
ANNE E. COVEY*
MICHAEL S. MORRIS**
This article shall examine the enforceability of agreements providing for
forum and choice of law selection. The forum selection clause and the
choice of law clause will be analyzed separately. The enforceability of a
forum selection clause involves a question of the court's jurisdiction. The
enforceability of a choice of law clause involves the determination of the
appropriate law to be applied.
Each type of clause is a separate and distinct issue, providing for differ-
ent considerations in resolution of whether the clause is enforceable. How-
ever, pertinent to both issues are the following Conflict of Laws values: (1)
predictability, (2) advancement of the relevant policies of concerned states,
(3) advancement of the basic policies underlying the field of law, and (4)
simplicity.
I. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
A. Introduction
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in M/S Bremen and Unterweser
Reederei v. Zapata Offshore Co.' departed from the traditional American view
that forum selection clauses are unenforceable because they are contrary to
public policy and oust the courts of jurisdiction.2 The Court framed the
issue to be addressed in determining the enforceability of the forum selection
* B.A., University of Delaware, 1981; J.D., Delaware Law School, 1984; member of the
Pennsylvania Bar.
** B.A., Holy Cross College, 1978; J.D., 1984, LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University,
1985; member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The Bremen decision has been extensively analyzed. See Collins,
Choice ofForum and the Exercise ofJudicial Discretion - The Resolution of an Anglo-American Conflict, 22
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 332 (1973); Collins, Forum Selection and An Anglo-American Conflict - The Sad
Case of The Chaparral, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 550 (1971); Delaume, Choice of Forum Clauses and the
American Forum Patriae; Something Happened on the Way to the Forum.- Zapata and Silver, 4 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 295 (1973); Farquhason, Choice ofForum Clauses - A Brie/Survey of Anglo-American Law, 8
INT'L LAW. 83 (1974); Juenger, Supreme Court Validation ofForum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 49 (1972); Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata." Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal
Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387 (1973); Nadelman, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United
States. The Road to Zapata, 21 Am. J. COMp. L. 124 (1973); Reese, The Supreme Court Supports
Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAw. 530 (1973); Note, The Enforcement of Forum
Selection Provisions in International Commercial Agreements, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1972);
Note, Choice of Forum, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 145 (1973).
2. 407 U.S. at 9. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957).
Judge Learned Hand in addressing the issue of the enforceability of forum-selection clauses
in 1949 said:
be the original reasons good or bad, courts have for long looked with strong disfavor
upon contracts by which a party surrenders resort to any forum which was lawfully
open to him. . . . In truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute
taboo against such contracts at all; in the words of the Restatement, they are invalid
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clause as follows: whether that court should have exercised its jurisdiction to
do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, mani-
fested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the fo-
rum selection clause. 3 The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that
forum selection clauses "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the
circumstances." 4
The Bremen case involved a private international towage agreement
whereby the plaintiff, Zapata, an American corporation, contracted with the
defendant, Unterweser, a German corporation, to tow Zapata's drilling rig
from Louisiana to Italy.5 While the flotilla was in international waters a
severe storm arose which resulted in serious damage to the drilling rig.
6
Zapata instructed the Bremen to tow its damaged rig to Tampa, Florida, the
nearest port of refuge.
7
Subsequently, Zapata instituted an admiralty suit in Florida against
Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in rem, alleging negligent towage
and breach of contract.8 Unterweser responded by invoking the forum selec-
tion clause which provided that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before
the London Court of Justice," and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 9
The Court, in addressing the issue of the enforceability of the forum
selection clause, reasoned that the expansion of American business and in-
dustry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we
insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws in our courts.10 The Court noted that "manifestly much uncertainty
and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could be
maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if juris-
diction were left to any place where the Bremen or Unterweser might hap-
pen to be found."' "I Thus, the Court ruled, "the elimination of all such
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is
an indispensable element in international trade, commerce and
only when unreasonable .... What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more
than a general hostility, which can be overcome, but which nevertheless does persist.
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 560-61 (2d Cir.) (Hand. J., concurring), cert.
denizd, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
In the Bremen case the Court stated that "the argument that such clauses are improper
because they tend to oust a court ofjurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction. No
one seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause 'ousted' the District Court of
jurisdiction over Zapata's action." 407 U.S. at 12.
3. 407 U.S. at 12.
4. Id at 10.
5. Id at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. I at 3-4.
9. Id. at 4. Unterweser also argued forum non conveniens, or in the alternative to stay the
action pending submission of the dispute to the London Court of Justice. Id
10. Id at 9. The Court noted that the enforceability of forum selection clauses is in accord
with other common-law countries including England, noted scholars, and the RESTATEMENT
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. Further, "it accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract
and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of American contractors who seek busi-
ness in all parts of the world." 407 U.S. at 11.
11. 407 U.S. at 13.
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contracting." 12
The Court established a four-prong test in determining the enforceabil-
ity of a forum selection clause. The Court held that the forum clause should
be specifically enforced unless the party resisting enforcement of the clause
can clearly show that, first, enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,
or second, the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.13
Moreover, the "contractual choice-of-forum clauses shall be held unenforce-
able if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought," 14 or if the resisting party can "show that trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court."'
5
B. The Aftermath of Bremen
Although the Bremen Court specifically limited its holding to federal dis-
trict courts sitting in admiralty, 16 the ruling and rationale of the Bremen deci-
sion has been applied by the courts to forum selection clauses generally.17
12. Id at 13-14. In support of this conclusion the Court cited National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964), which held, "that parties to a contract may agree
in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether."
A forum selection clause may also be interpreted as a consent or submission to the desig-
nated court's jurisdiction. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 101 (1977).
13. 407 U.S. at 15. The party resisting enforcement of the forum clause bears a heavy
burden of proof. Id. at 18, 19.
14. Id. The Court ruled that the public policy may be declared by statute or judicial deci-
sion. The Court rejected Zapata's argument that the exculpatory clause contained in the agree-
ment violated American public policy as expressed in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349
U.S. 85 (1955). It held that these cases were inapposite because they involved a towage business
in American waters and the policy expressed did not extend to the instant case. 407 U.S. at 15-
16.
15. 407 U.S. at 18. The Court reasoned:
where it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time they entered the con-
tract, the parties to a freely negotiated private international commercial agreement
contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of
inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause unenforceable.
Id at 16.
16. Id. at 10.
17. In support of expanding the Bremen holding to forum selection clauses generally, the
courts have relied on the fact that the Bremen Court cited cases to sustain its position that were
not limited to admiralty suits. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing
an arbitration forum clause based on Bremen); See also Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am.
Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982) (the Bremen Court's reasoning applies to domestic suits in light
of the Scherk Court's adoption of Bremen which involved federal jurisdiction other than admiralty
and the Bremen Court's statement that the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is simply the
other side of the proposition recognized in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311 (1964), a case which involved no international question); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Va. 1982) (while the court in Bremen stated that this is
the correct doctrine to be followed in admiralty, the court relied, in support of the rule it ac-
cepted, on cases that are not so limited, and that also indicates that this is the proper doctrine to
apply to forum selection clauses generally); Hoes of Am. Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D.
I1. 1979) (rationale of Bremen extends beyond admiralty to civil actions in contract and tort as
well); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (although the Supreme Court deci-
sion came in the context of a choice between a forum in this country and one in England, the
principles announced in it would seem equally applicable to domestic choice of forum ques-
tions). C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COPPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803
(1976).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:4
Thus, the Bremen decision has become the focal point in determining the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.
The issue of the enforceability of agreements providing for forum selec-
tion usually arises when the contractual parties have stipulated in their
agreement that suit shall be maintained in a specified forum and the plain-
tiff commences suit in violation of that agreement.' 8 In defense to this ac-
tion the defendant raises the forum selection clause and moves to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. Where the action is commenced in a state court the
forum will determine the enforceability of the forum selection clause accord-
ing to its law.' 9 However, where the action involves diversity jurisdiction,
the federal courts are divided on whether state law under the Erie doctrine
20
or federal law applies.2 ' The importance of this determination is based on
18. A typical forum clause provides that jurisdiction or venue arising from any causes of
action between the parties to the contract shall be in state X. Frequently, the language of the
forum selection clause is a decisive factor in the court's determination of which court is the
proper forum to hear the dispute. See Bense, 683 F.2d at 720 (any dispute arising directly or
indirectly from this agreement); Miller Concrete Prod. Corp. v. Quickset Vault Sales Corp., 309
F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (any cause of action interpreted as providing for either state
or federal court); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. at 974 (language interpreted to mean suit
could be brought only in state court not in federal court).
Even where the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary seeking to enforce the contract, it has
generally been held that he is bound by the forum clause. The basis for the courts' rulings in
applying the Bremen rule to third party beneficiaries is the general contract principle that a third
party beneficiary has no greater rights than those of the contracting party through which it
claims. Further, the third party beneficiary is sufficiently protected by the "reasonableness"
requirement. See Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205
(W.D. Va. 1982); Process and Storage Vessels v. Tank Service, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725, 733 (D.
Del. 1982); Hoes, 493 F. Supp. at 1209.
This Note examines a written forum selection clause, not an oral forum selection clause.
19. Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 A.2d 231 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Kronovet
v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980).
20. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (in a diversity case the federal court shall
follow the substantive law of the state in which it sits).
21. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965), held that the rule of Erie is rooted in part
in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation to materially
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court rather than a state court.
The following cases held that state law determined the enforceability of the choice of forum
clause: Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Leasewell Ltd. v. Jake
Sheton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. l011, 1015 (S.D. Va. 1976).
The following cases held that the federal rule in Bremen governed the enforceability of the
choice of forum clause: Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp.
815, 818 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 401 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D.
Mass. 1975); Gaskin v. Stumn Handel Gmb H, 390 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The following cases did not resolve the issue, because the state and federal laws on the
enforceability of forum selection clauses were substantially the same: Coastal Steel Corp. v.
Tilghman Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 709 F.2d 190, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. National
Equip. Rental, 643 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1981); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966); Process and Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725, 732-33 (Del. 1982); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967, 980 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The Supreme Court in The Bremen and in Scherk appears to have assumed without
saying so that in a federal forum the enforceability of a forum selection clause is deter-
mined by a generally applicable federal law. This court in Copperweld Steel Co. v.
Kemag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 956-66 (3d Cir. 1978), appears to have
made the same unarticulated assumption. It is not entirely clear why, absent a statute
such as the Federal Arbitration Act, the enforceability of a contractual forum selection
clause should properly be divorced from the law which in other respects governs the
contract.
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the fact that not only is there an issue regarding the enforceability of the
clause, but also its impact on procedural rules.
22
Therefore, the federal court's determination of whether state or federal
law applies not only affects the decision of whether the clause is enforceable,
but also whether the issue is one of jurisdiction or venue, which affects the
status of the case and the costs incurred. As a consequence of this uncer-
tainty, the predictability to be afforded by the insertion of the forum clause
is substantially lessened.
Choice of forum clauses have become more prevalent in commercial
contracts since the Bremen decision, which pronounced the presumptive va-
lidity of such clauses. The Bremen Court cited several reasons for the enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses. First, the transaction involved a freely
negotiated private international agreement. 23 Second, the parties sought to
provide for a neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes. 24 Third, "the
elimination of all uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum accepta-
ble to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, com-
merce and contracting."'25 Additional reasons for upholding an agreement
containing a forum clause are freedom of contract, 26 predictability, 27 expec-
tation of the parties28 and that the clause was part of the bargained for
agreement.
29
709 F.2d at 201.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) provides that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought" (change of venue).
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982) provides that "the district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought" (defec-
tive venue).
There is a distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction is the power and au-
thority of a court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding. Venue is the geographical area
in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
766, 1396 (5th ed. 1979).
Central Contracting Co. v. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (1965),
held:
The modern and correct rule is that, while private parties may not by contract prevent
a court from asserting its jurisdiction or change the rules of venue, nevertheless, a court
in which venue is proper and which has jurisdiction should decline to proceed with the
cause when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in another
forum and where such agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation.
23. 407 U.S. at 13.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 11.
27. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (a contractual provision specifying
in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated is an almost indispensable precondi-
tion to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction); V. Tilghman Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 709 F.2d 190, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1983) (the
primary rationale for enforcement of forum selection clauses, is that those clauses promote sta-
ble and dependable trade relations); Gordonsvdle Indus. 549 F. Supp. at 205 (by including the
forum clause in the contract, the two parties eliminated the uncertainties and great inconve-
niences that both parties could confront by being forced to adjudicate the contract in a forum
unfamiliar to both parties).
28. 407 U.S. at 12.
29. Id. at 14 (the court noted, "There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital
part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause
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Notwithstanding these reasons in favor of upholding a forum selection
clause, the enforcement of such a clause is not an absolute right.30 The
Bremen decision and its progeny have pronounced limitations to the enforce-
ability of forum selection clauses. The primary limitations as discussed be-
low are fraud, public policy, adhesion, statutory restrictions and
inconvenience of the contractual forum.
C. Limitations
1. Fraud
The Bremen Court ruled that the forum clause should be specifically en-
forced unless the resisting party could clearly show that the clause was inva-
lid for reasons of fraud or overreaching. 3 1 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. the
Supreme Court further defined this rule:
This qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising
out of a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud . . .the
clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that [a] . ..forum selec-
tion clause in a contract is not enforceable if the incluszon of that
clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion.
32
Thus, when the issue of fraud is raised it must first be determined
whether the fraud was in the inducement of the forum selection clause or in
the inducement of the agreement. If the fraud relates to the agreement and
the forum selection clause is otherwise valid the clause will be given effect.
The issues involved are separate and distinct and the mere allegation of the
invalidity of the agreement will not avoid enforcement of the forum clause.
33
2. Public Policy
Similarly, agreements providing for forum selection have been held un-
enforceable where they contravene a public policy of the forum state. 34 The
Bremen Court ruled that a contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held
figuring prominently in their calculations"); Hoes, 493 F. Supp. at 1207 (it is uncontradicted
that the defendant considered the forum provision essential and would not have entered the
contract unless agreed to by the plaintiff).
30. Coastal Steel Corp. 709 F.2d at 196. Leflar contends that "[c]hoice-of-forum contract
provisions are today generally regarded as neither absolutely binding nor absolutely void, but
rather as factors which help a court to exercise its discretion on a reasonable basis as to whether
its legally existent jurisdiction ought to be exercised." LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 100.
31. 407 U.S. at 15 (a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by
fraud should be given effect).
32. 417 U.S. at 519 n.14 (emphasis original).
33. Giordano v. I.R. Witzer, Co., 558 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (the plaintiff's charge of fraud in
the inducement of the agreement of sale is not sufficient to invalidate the forum selection
clause); A.C. Miller Concrete Prod. v. Quikset Vault Sales, 309 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 n.2
(notwithstanding "plaintiff's attack against the substance of the agreement ... to allow him to
upset the venue provisions as well . . . would be to provide an easy escape from such provisions
by merely calling the entire contract into question"). See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT
§ 3(4), which provides that a choice-of-forum clause will be enforced unless it was obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means. (The
Act was cited with approval in Bremen).
34. Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963); Bisso v.
Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon,
642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981); Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
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unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision. 35 The Court illustrated this limitation by indicating that selection
of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to an essentially American
controversy might otherwise contravene an important public policy of the
forum.
3 6
However, what constitutes a strong public policy is not adequately de-
fined and the courts may interpose other reasons for upholding the clause.
For example, in Hoes of America, Inc. v. Hoei 7 the plaintiff objected to trial in
Germany, the stipulated forum, on the grounds that there was no right to
trial by jury, limited opportunity for discovery that was deemed essential to
the dispute, and no right to punitive damages. 38 The Court rejected the
public policy argument and held that the German law was well settled on all
of these points at the time of contracting.
39
Thus, the issue of whether a forum clause will be unenforceable as con-
travening a public policy depends on (1) the strength of the policy in relation
to the policy of upholding forum clauses, and (2) the impact such decision
will have on the forum.
3. Adhesion Contracts
In Bremen the Court emphasized that the agreement containing the fo-
rum selection clause was consummated in an arm's-length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen. 40 This fact was decisive to the
Court's ruling that forum clauses are prima facie valid, for the Court noted
that such a rule would be inapplicable where the agreement was affected by
undue influence, overweening bargaining power or overreaching.
4 '
Adhesion contracts 42 providing for forum selection are generally held
35. 407 U.S. at 15. See supra note 14.
36. 407 U.S. at 17. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 906 (5th Cir. 1970)
Judge Wisdom in his dissent reasoned:
In cases of bunkruptcy, divorce, successions, real rights and regulation of public au-
thorities, for example, courts cannot remit the dispute to a foreign forum lest a foreign
court render a decree conflicting with our ordering of these affairs. And in cases where
objectionable activity within our jurisdiction would be encouraged by the foreign
court's decree, we would reach a similar result.
37. 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. 11. 1979).
38. Id at 1209.
39. Id The court noted that under Bremen parties can waive important substantive and
procedural rights. However, the plaintiff cannot waive his right to some type of full and fair
hearing on his claims. Id MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(2) provides that a choice-of-
forum clause will be enforced unless the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the state of the
contractual forum. See J. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
Ky. L.J. 1, 43 (1976).
40. 407 U.S. at 12.
41. Id at 12, 15. Where it is found that the contract providing for forum selection is one of
adhesion the clause will not be enforced. However, the contrary is true where the contract is
invalid for reason of fraud and the forum selection clause is otherwise valid. See supra notes 32-
33 and accompanying text.
42. The term adhesion contracts originated as "contract d'adhesion" as used by Raymond
Saleilles in his book DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE 229 (1901). He defined adhesion con-
tracts as those:
in which one predominant unilateral will dictates its law to an undetermined multi-
tude rather than to an individual . . . as in all employment contracts of big industry,
19841
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unenforceable. 43 However, notwithstanding this defense to the enforcement
of a forum selection clause, the courts give weight to a showing of inequality
of bargaining power and lack of free negotiations. 44 The mere allegation
that the contract was a pre-printed form issued by a large corporation and
the plaintiff had no opportunity to read the agreement is not sufficient to
overcome the Bremen rule.
45
4. Statutory Restrictions
An additional limitation or defense to the enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause is statutory restrictions. 46 The primary considerations in the
strength of this defense are the statute involved and the court's interpreta-
tion of the statute.
Generally, a forum selection clause will be held unenforceable where
the statute expresses a public policy which would be contravened by enforce-
ment of the clause. An example of this type of statute is the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).4 7 The Act provides that any clause in a con-
tract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability or lessening
transportation contracts of big railroad companies and all those contracts which, as
the Romans said, resemble a law much more than a meeting of the minds.
Ste also Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1970); FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 295 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Union Ins. Socy, 642 F.2d at 724 (denied enforcement of the forum clause,
holding that the terms of the bill of lading were not agreed to through hard bargaining, but
rather represented the forum clauses of an adhesion contract); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510
F. Supp. 905, 908-09 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (refusing to enforce a forum-enforcement clause not freely
bargained for between the parties). But see, Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 873
(D. Minn. 1980) (finding the forum selection clause not unreasonable).
The remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or that
the parties did not have the particular controversy in mind when they made their agreement;
yet even there the party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof. 407 U.S. at 17. See
LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 101.
44. See e.g., Hoffman v. National Equipment Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d at 991 (4th Cir. 1981)
(the fact that the forum and process clauses appeared in a form contract used by a large corpo-
ration is not sufficient to nullify the plaintiffs consent; ignorance due to failure to read is not an
excuse; this was not a common "take-it-or-leave-it" form of contract); Mercury Coal & Coke,
Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (each party pos-
sessed a sophisticated knowledge of the coal industry; although the defendant was the more
substantial concern, the plaintiff did not suffer from a dearth of commercial expertise; ignorance
due to failure to read the contract is no excuse); Richardson Engineering, 554 F. Supp. at 469
(holding that plaintiff, an experienced and sophisticated business entity, cannot complain of
overweening bargaining power). See also North River Ins. Co. v. Fed Sea/Fed Pac. Line, 647
F.2d 985, 988 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia,
Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1974); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir.
1973); Giordano v. Witzer, 558 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Quick Erectors, Inc. v.
Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351, 356 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Paterson, Zochones (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Compania United Arrows, 493 F. Supp. 626, 630 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Full-Sight Contact Lens
Corp. v. Soft Lenses Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) comment a provides: a fo-
rum selection clause will be disregarded if it is the result of overreaching or the unfair use of
unequal bargaining power. See also MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, § 3(4) (1968).
45. See Hoffman, 643 F.2d at 991.
46. This defense is similar to the defense of public policy. The Brenen court ruled that a
contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or
by judicial decision. 407 U.S. at 15.
47. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void and of no effect. 48 The congressional purpose which led to the enact-
ment of the COGSA was to reduce uncertainty concerning the responsibili-
ties and liabilities of carriers, shippers and underwriters who insure
waterborne cargo.
49
The Act has been interpreted as invalidating any contractual provision
that would prevent cargo able to obtain jurisdiction over a carrier in an
American court from having that court entertain the suit and apply the sub-
stantive rules Congress had prescribed. 50 Thus, it has been held that the
general policy of the enforceability of forum selection clauses must abdicate
before the specific policy enunciated by Congress through COGSA. 5 ' The
Bremen decision has been held not to control because forum selection clauses
are presumptively valid only in the absence of any congressional policy on
the subject.
52
However, the courts are divided regarding the issue of whether the
Bremen rule governs agreements providing for forum selection when COGSA
is not otherwise applicable but has been incorporated by contract. 53 It has
48. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8). COGSA applies to every bill of lading or similar document which
is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in
foreign trade. 46 U.S.C. § 1300.
49. H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
50. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (1967). The Court interpreted
§ 1303(8) of COGSA to prohibit forum selection clauses:
A clause making a claim triable only in a foreign court would almost certainly lessen
liability if the law which the court would apply was neither the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act nor the Hague Rules. Even when the foreign court would apply one or the
other of these regimes, requiring trial abroad might lessen the carrier's liability since
there could be no assurance that it would apply them in the same way as would an
American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the Supreme Court, and § 3(8)
can well be read as covering a potential and not simply a demonstrable lessening of
liability.
377 F.2d at 203-04. Indussa overruled Wm. H. Muller &Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903. See also Union Ins. Soc>, 642 F.2d at 725 n.4; Zima
Corp. v. M.V. Roman Pazinski, 493 F. Supp. 268, 276 nn.13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Cf Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296 (lst Cir. 1974); Roach v.
Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
51. See Union Ins. Soc)', 642 F.2d at 725. See also supra note 50.
52. See Union Ins. Soc), 642 F.2d at 724. This court also suggested that COGSA was not
applicable to the Bremen case because no bill of lading was involved and a mobile offshore
drilling rig is not a "good" while being towed within the meaning of the Act. 642 F.2d at 724
n.3. See 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b) and (c). See also 407 U.S. at 10 n. 11.
53. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 provides that any bill of lading for the carriage of goods by sea be-
tween domestic ports, "containing an express statement that it shall be subject to the provisions
of this chapter, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject hereto by the express provisions of
this chapter."
§ 1312 applies only when COGSA is incorporated into domestic carriage contracts otherwise
governed by the Harter Act. North River Ins. Co., 647 F.2d at 988.
See, Pan American World Airways v. California Stevedore & Ballast, 559 F.2d 1173, 1175
n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (held that when the parties contracted for the application of COGSA to
domestic carriage, all terms inconsistent with the Act were invalid); Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. M.V.
Glory River, 464 F.Supp. 1004, 1004 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
The following cases held that under the language of § 1312 parties may contract for terms
inconsistent with COGSA while at the same time agreeing to incorporate the Act into their
contract of carriage: North River Ins. Co. 647 F.2d at 989 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948
(1982); Ralston Purina Co. v. Barge Juneau & Gulf Carribbean Marine Lines, Inc., 619 F.2d
374, 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Commonwealth Petro-chemicals, Inc. v. S/S Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322
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been held that COGSA does not preempt all contract terms when its sole
force is by incorporation into a contract for foreign transportation. 54 There-
fore, Bremen is the correct rule to follow in such circumstances in determining
the enforceability of the forum clause.
5 5
The Federal Railway Labor Act 56 has also been interpreted as expres-
sing a public policy which has resulted in the invalidation of forum selection
clauses.5 7 The Act has been interpreted as prohibiting any agreement limit-
ing liability, including liability to be sued in the forum of the plaintiff's
choice.5 8 Therefore, in effect, a forum selection clause has been held as limit-
ing the defendant's liability and thus unenforceable as contrary to statutory
policy.
Cases involving the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts 59 have raised
similar issues of whether a forum selection clause is unenforceable as contra-
vening congressional policy. Contrary to the previously cited cases, it has
generally been held that enforcement of the forum clause would not subvert
any congressional purpose and the Clayton Act venue provision may be
(4th Cir. 1979); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Ashland Oil Co.-Thomas Petroleum Transit Div., 527 F.2d
502, 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
54. North River Ins. Co., 647 F.2d at 989. See supra note 53.
55. 647 F.2d at 989.
56. 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1982).
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to
the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon free-
dom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or
otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the
complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization
to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151a.
57. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); Krenger v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949). The Boyddecision was cited with
approval in Bremen. 407 U.S. at 15. See also Aacon Auto Transp., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (applied Boydto the
Interstate Commerce Act § 20(11), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1982)). § 20(11) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act provides:
Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of
this chapter . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to
the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury. . . and no contract, receipt,
rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability imposed; . . .
any such limitation . . . [is] unlawful and void ...
58. See supra note 57. The same result has been reached in cases involving the Miller Act,
40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(d) (1982). See United States ex. rel. Giglielle v. Sovereign Constr. Co., 311 F.
Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1970). Contra In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979).
§ 270(b) of the Miller Act provides:
Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of the United
States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District Court for any
district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere,
irrespective of the amount in controversy in such suit.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). 15 U.S.C. § 22 provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found to transact business; and all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
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waived by contract.
60
Similarly, in Scherk the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the forum selection clause to arbitrate disputes was unenforceable under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereun-
der.6 ' The Court held
[aln agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the
situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dis-
pute. The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us
would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn prom-
ise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.
62
It was found that no congressional policy would be violated by enforcement
of the forum clause.
The Bankruptcy Code 63 has also been interpreted as not prohibiting the
enforcement of forum selection clauses.64 The congressional policy underly-
ing the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a broad protective federal jurisdiction
to facilitate the collection and distribution of debtors' estates. Notwithstand-
ing this policy it has been held that the parties' forum selection clause will be
upheld.
65
Therefore, the determination of whether a statutory restriction will pre-
vent enforcement of a forum selection clause is dependent on the particular
statute at issue and the court's interpretation of the underlying policy.
5. Inconvenience of the Contractual Forum
The first prong of the Bremen test provides that a forum clause shall be
specifically enforced unless the resisting party could clearly show that en-
forcement would be unreasonable or unjust. 6 6 The Court defined unreason-
ableness to be that the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the plaintiff will for all practical purposes be deprived of
60. Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 720; Full-Sight Contact Lens, Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc.,
466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(2).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a), provides: "[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any
rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
62. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. at 519. The Court distinguished the present case from Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which held the arbitration forum clause as violative of the policy
expressed in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982). The basis for the Court's distinc-
tion was the language and purpose of the two Acts.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982).
64. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 202.
65. Id. The Court noted:
when relying on a contract in proceeding brought under section 1471(b), a trustee or
debtor takes the contract as the parties made it. Nothing in the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code has been called to our attention suggesting that Congress in-
tended to make a change in the public policy favoring forum clauses which is mani-
fested in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976), or in the common law
announced in the Bremen and similar state and federal cases.
709 F.2d at 202.
66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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his day in court. 6 7 However, the Court qualified this limitation by adding a
foreseeability element. The Court reasoned that where it can be said with
reasonable assurance that at the time the parties entered into the contract
they contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any
such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause un-
enforceable. 68 Notwithstanding the element of foreseeability, the courts ad-
dress the issue of inconvenience as of the time of litigation.
69
Although there are few guidelines in determining what constitutes un-
reasonableness, it has been unanimously held that a mere claim of inconven-
ience or additional expense is not unreasonable. 70 However, the location of
the parties and witnesses is generally a factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of the contractual forum.7 Thus, the determination of whether a forum
clause is unreasonable is decided on a case-by-case basis depending upon the
particular facts involved.
72
Similar to the claim of inconvenience of the contractual forum is the
67. 407 U.S. at 17. The Court observed that where an agreement between two Americans
provided for resolution of their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum, the serious
inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater weight
in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause; yet even there the party claiming incon-
venience should bear a heavy burden of proof. Id.
68. Id at 16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 which provides
that the parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot deprive a state court of jurisdic-
tion, but such an agreement will be given effect if it is fair and reasonable. Comment a explains
further that such a provision will be disregarded, however, if the forum chosen by the parties
would be seriously inconvenient for the trial of the particular action. The MODEL CHOICE OF
FORUM ACT § 3(3) provides that a choice-of-forum clause will be enforced unless the contrac-
tual forum would be substantially less convenient for trial of the action.
69. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co., 209 A.2d at 816, cited with approval in Bremen, held an
agreement containing a forum selection clause "is unreasonable only where its enforcement
would, under all circumstances existing at the time of the litigation, seriously impair plaintiffs
ability to pursue his cause of action." See also Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at 344; Anastasi
Bros., Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 863-64; Full-Sight Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 73; Process and Storage
Vessels, 541 F. Supp. at 733. (All courts holding that although the contractual forum may not
be the most convenient forum it is by no means an unreasonable site).
70. Central Contracting, Co., 209 A.2d at 816. The Court ruled:
Mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness since it
can be assumed that the plaintiff received under the contract consideration for these
things. If the agreed upon forum is available to [the] plaintiff and said forum can do
substantial justice to the cause of action then [the] plaintiff should be bound by his
agreement.
Id. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203; Bense, 683 F.2d at 722; Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at
344; Gordonsville Indus., 549 F. Supp. at 205; Anastas, Bros., 519 F. Supp. at 864; Full-Sight 466 F.
Supp. at 344; Spatr, 364 F. Supp. at 981 (lack of proof of unreasonableness is fatal to the plain-
tiff's claim); Elia Corp., 391 A.2d at 216. See supra note 29.
71. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203; Mercuq Coal &Coke, Inc., 696 F.2d at 318; Bense, 683
F.2d at 722; Copperweld Steel Co., 578 F.2d at 965; Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at 344; Richard-
son Engineering, 541 F. Supp. at 73; Process and Storage Vessels, 519 F. Supp. at 864; Full-Sight
Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 73; Elia Corp., 391 A.2d at 216 (The Elha court rejected the follow-
ing factors in determining whether the forum selection clause was unreasonable: The law gov-
erning the formation and construction of the contract, the residences of the parties, the place of
execution and/or performance). Even where the contractual forum may inconvenience wit-
nesses because of the distance, the courts' normal response is the use of depositions. See 407 U.S.
at 19 (there is no reason to conclude that Zapata could not use deposition testimony to equal
advantage if forced to litigate in London as it bound itself to do).
72. The Bremen Court remanded the case to the district court on the issue of unreasonable-
ness. 407 U.S. at 19-20.
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defense of forum non conveniens. 73 However, these limitations or defenses
are separate and distinct issues, involving separate considerations, and are
recognized as such by the courts. 74 The primary consideration under a
claim of forum non conveniens is that the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed, placing a heavy burden of proof upon the defendant to
show that the balance is strongly in his favor. 75 Whereas, under an allega-
tion of inconvenience of the contractual forum the plaintiff has the heavy
burden of proving not only that the balance of convenience is strongly in his
favor, but also that trial in the contractual forum will effectively deprive him
of a meaningful day in court. 76 Thus, the inconvenience of the contractual
forum is a more stringent test to satisfy.
73. The forum non conveniens doctrine was defined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). The Court stated, "The principle ofform non corwenies is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute." Id at 507 (emphasis original). The Court established the following
guidelines:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the
enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advan-
tages and obstacles to fair trial. . . . Factors of public interest also have a place in
applying the doctrine.
Id. at 508. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
[In the determination of a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion, a forum selection clause is
merely one of many factors to be considered by the court.] Only one of these - the
convenience of the parties - is properly within the power of the parties themselves to
affect by a forum-selection clause. The other factors - the convenience of witnesses and
the interest of justice - are third party or public interests that must be weighed by the
district court; they cannot be automatically outweighed by the existence of a purely
private agreement between the parties. Such an agreement does not obviate the need
for an analysis of the factors set forth in § 1404(a) and does not necessarily preclude
the granting of the motion to transfer.
Plum Tree, Inc. 488 F.2d at 758; Full-Stght Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 74. See supra notes 22 &
68-71 and accompanying text. Where a case is transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court
must apply the choice of law rules of the state from which the case was transferred. Van Dusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 643 (1964).
74. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 204; Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 725 (denied enforcement
of the forum selection clause under COGSA, but remanded on the issue of forum non-
conveniens).
75. GulfOtl, 330 U.S. at 508 (unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed). See In re Unterweser Reedere, 428 F.2d at
905-06; Hoes, Inc., 493 F. Supp. at 1208; Full-Sight Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 74; A.C Miller
Concrete Prod., 309 F. Supp. at 1095.
76. 407 U.S. at 19. Another defense to enforcement of a forum selection clause frequently
raised is that the cause of action did not arise under the contract. However, the courts have
generally rejected this argument on the basis that the plaintiff cannot escape enforcement of the
forum clause based on his form of pleading. See, e.g., Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203 (where
the relationship between the parties is contractual, the pleading of alternative non-contractual
theories of liability should not prevent enforcement of such a bargain; bankruptcy proceeding);
Bense 683 F.2d 718 (franchise agreement with forum clause and antitrust claim); Giordano, 558 F.
Supp. 1261 (forum selection clause and tort claim); Gordonsvillelndus., 549 F. Supp. 200 (contract
for industrial installation with forum clause and state law design defect, negligence, and war-
ranty claims); Hoes, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 1205 (distributorship agreement with forum selection
clause and state law business tort claim); Full-Si&ht Contract Lens, 466 F. Supp. 71 (distributorship
agreement and antitrust claim). See also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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D. Summaiy
Although the courts' primary rationale for enforcing forum selection
clauses is based on the expectations of the parties and to provide certainty in
the contractual relationship, these objectives have not been achieved. Limi-
tations to the enforceability of forum clauses were established in the Bremen
ruling and subsequent decisions have further eroded the prima facie validity
of such clauses. The courts have been restrained in not creating numerous
other exceptions to the general rule. However, in light of the parties' pur-
pose for including a forum clause in their agreement in order to insure pre-
dictability in their relationship, such objective has not been attained.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Introducti on
The general rule regarding the enforceability of agreements providing
for choice of law selection is that where parties to a freely negotiated con-
tract have stipulated the law of a particular state to govern any disputes,
arising out of their agreement, will be enforced in accordance with the stipu-
lated clause. 77 This view has superseded the traditional approach that
choice of law clauses are unenforceable because it empowers the parties to
perform a legislative act. 78 The prevalent legal theory justifying the modern
trend is as follows:
Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the legislative function,
77. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274
U.S. 403 (1927); Woods - Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744
(5th Cir. 1981); Zenith Labs. Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974);
Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1970); Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service
Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969); First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Insurance Centers,
Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Mo. 1983); R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp.
201 (N.D. I11. 1981); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980); Falcon Tankers,
Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 A.2d 231 (Del. 1972).
The Boase Court held that conflict of laws principles generally are not offended by the
application of a contractual choice of law provision. 437 F.2d at 529. See Prebble, Choice of Law
& Contracts, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (1973); Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and
Directionsfor the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I (1977).
78. F. MADL, FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 101 (1967)
(the parties are not making up their own law but rather merely exercising a right of choice, the
right to select one of the legal systems containing provisions for the very transaction to which
they then submit themselves); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 637 (1982) (the choice-
of-law clause is merely a shorthand expression for a more detailed definition of the rights and
obligations of the parties); Prebble, supra note 77, at 495 (jurisdictions adopting the autonomy
doctrine simply predicate certain legal consequences (the application of the chosen law) upon
the factual conduct of the parties (the making of the choice)); see Reese, supra note 77, at 19 (the
parties do not of their own authority determine the applicable law; it is the choice-of-law rule of
the forum which directs that the law chosen by them should be applied).
A further rationale for rejecting the traditional approach is that the contents of a contract
are determined by the parties and where the parties have not provided for certain matters then
contract law serves as a gap-filler. See Prebble, supra note 77, at 491 (if the parties would have
been at liberty to provide for their own solutions at the time of making their contract, there is
no reason why they should not be able to do the same thing indirectly by expressly stipulating
-that such questions should be dealt with according to the law of a particular state or nation);
Reese supra note 77, at 22 (majority of contract law rules are designed to fill gaps in the contract
that the parties could have filled by express provision).
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it seems more realistic to regard them as relieving the courts of the
problem of resolving a question of conflict of laws. Their course
might be expected to reduce litigation, and is to be commended as
much as good draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities. . . . A tendency toward certainty in com-
mercial transactions should be encouraged by the courts.
79
In addition to judicial authority, the general enforceability of choice of
law clauses has also been adopted by the legislatures in their enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code80 and by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws."' The majority of jurisdictions now enforce proper choice of law
clauses relying on either the U.C.C. or the Restatement. 82 In synthesizing
the legal authorities it is readily apparent that the presumption is in favor of
the enforceability of agreements providing for choice of law selection.
The issue of the enforceability of a choice of law clause involves the
determination by the forum court as to which state law will govern the con-
tractual relationship. Unlike the forum selection clause, the choice of law
clause does not negate the court's authority to adjudicate the suit, but rather
addresses the court's willingness to apply the parties' choice of state law.
83
As a prerequisite to the enforceability of an agreement providing for a choice
79. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pakistan, 307 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. N.Y 1969); Siegel-
man v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955). See, Denicola v. Cunard Line
Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1981).
80. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1978) provides: "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to
this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
The U.C.C. has been adopted in some form in all but one state. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at
749 citing In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) provides:
Law of the State Chosen by the Parties (1) The law of the state chosen by the parties
to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transac-
tion and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamen-
tal policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule
of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effec-
tive choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local
law of the state of the chosen law.
82. See, e.g., Unionlns. Soc., 642 F.2d at 748-51 (the purpose of the U.C.C. is to establish a
national uniform law to govern commercial transactions); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471
F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (lst Cir. 1973) (Restatement); First Nat'l Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263-64
(U.C.C.); R &L Grain Co., 531 F. Supp. at 206 (U.C.C.); Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites
De Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (U.C.C.); Southern Int'l Sales Co. v.
Potter & Brumfield Div. of AMF, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Restatement);
Kronovet, 288 Md. at 44-47, 415 A.2d at 1104-06 (Restatement). Falcon Tankers, 300 A.2d at 235
(U.C.C.); Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271, 292-93 (W.D. Mo.
1973) (Restatement).
83. State is used in a generic sense not only encompassing the territorial lands of the
United States, but also those of foreign countries.
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of law selection, the contract must involve a multistate transaction. 84 An-
other condition, depending upon state procedural rules, is where the defend-
ant seeks to have the law as provided in the agreement govern the
adjudication of the suit.8 5 The forum court in determining the enforceabil-
ity of the clause will apply both its own substantive and conflict of laws
rules.86 Where suit is brought in federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion, the court will apply the law of the forum state in which it is sitting,
including the forum state's conflict of law rules.
87
Once the forum state holds the choice of law clause valid, the court will
examine whether the clause is enforceable under the law of the chosen
state.8 8 Assuming the clause is held enforceable, it then must be determined
whether the parties intended the application of only the substantive law of
the designated state or in addition, its conflict of law rules. 89 Resolution of
this issue is focused primarily on the language of the choice of law clause.90
Choice of law clauses, like forum selection clauses, have become more
84. See Prebble, supra note 77, at 501 (parties to a wholly domestic or local contract may
not avoid mandatory rules of domestic or local law by purporting to select some other law to
govern their relationship); Reese, supra note 77, at 24. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment d which provides that the rule does not apply when all
contacts are located within a single state and when, as a consequence, there is only one inter-
ested state.
85. The procedure for raising the issue of the enforceability of the choice of law clause,
whether by affirmative defense or otherwise, depends on the procedural rules of the forum state.
It is usually the defendant who seeks to have the clause enforced which is dissimilar to a forum
selection clause where the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
86. Kronovet, 288 Md. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1106.
87. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in a federal diversity suit the federal court must follow the state conflict of
laws rules in which it sits). Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514 (choice of law rules of the forum
state); Delta Airlines, 503 F.2d at 243 (in a diversity case the federal court must follow state law
including state conflict of law rules); Boase, 437 F.2d at 529 (choice of law rules of the forum
state); Potter &Brumftld, 410 F. Supp. at 1341 (choice of laws rules of the forum state).
88. See Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514; Gavlick Constr. Co., 526 F.2d at 785 n. 18; Delta Air
Lines, 503 F.2d 243-45; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529-31; First Natl Bank 560 F. Supp. at 1263-64;
Kronovet, 288 Md. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1106.
89. See Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529; Farris Eng'g Corp., 406 F.2d
at 521; R &L Grain Co., 531 F.Supp. at 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 comment h provides that, "[tihe cases generally support the news that it is the local laws
of the state chosen by the parties that should be applied."
90. In order to ensure predictability and the desired interpretation of the choice of law
clause, the parties should clearly express whether they intend only the substantive law of the
chosen state to apply or also its conflict of law rules.
A typical choice of law clause reads as follows: The validity of this agreement or any of the
provisions thereof shall be determined under and shall be construed according to the laws of the
state of X.
This clause would create an ambiguity as to whether the parties intended only the state's
substantive law to apply or also its conflict of law rules. Such an ambiguity could frustrate the
expectations of the parties and therefore their intent should be clearly expressed.
Another ambiguity which may arise in choice of law clauses is whether the law of the
selected state is to govern the validity of the parties' agreement or merely its construction.
Again, the parties' intent should be clearly expressed in order to prevent frustration of their
expectations.
Some commentators argue that it is beyond the capacity of the parties to choose the law
that shall govern the validity of their agreement because such power may be invoked to have an
otherwise invalid contract enforced. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 361 (2d ed. 1980).
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prevalent in commercial contracts.9 1 The primary reasons advocated for en-
forcement of a choice of law clause are party autonomy, 92 expectation of the
parties,93 predictability, 94 certainty95 and the promotion of business transac-
tions.96 The Supreme Court in Scherk observed that a "contractual provision
specifying in advance the. . . law to be applied is. . .an almost indispensa-
ble precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essen-
tial to any international business transaction.
' 9 7
Notwithstanding the benefits to be achieved by enforcement of choice of
law clauses, there are limitations to the parties' capacity to choose what law
will govern their contractual relationship. 98 These limitations which are dis-
cussed below include a reasonable relationship to the state of the chosen law,
absence of fraud, not violative of public policy, non-adhesion, and neither
evasion of law nor choice of invalidating law.
91. WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 360 (choice-of-law clauses are becoming "ubiquitous
boiler plate" in commercial agreements); LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 303.
Under some circumstances a choice of forum clause might also be viewed as implicitly
selecting the law of that place to govern the transaction. Alberto-Culver, 471 U.S. at 519 n.13.
92. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 751; Kronovet, 288 Md. at 42-47, 415 A.2d at 1103-05 (courts
should give recognition to party autonomy in conflict of laws relating to contracts). Scoles, supra
note 78, at 632-52; Weintraub, supra note 90, at 355-57 (the reason advanced for the party-
autonomy choice-of-law rule on questions of contracts is that this rule best accords with the
need of the commercial community and predictability in interstate and international transac-
tions). Levin, Party Autonomy. Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260
(1957-58); Prebble, supra note 77, at 491-533; See Weinberger, Party Autonomy and Choice-of-Law:
The Restatement (Second), Interest Analysis, and the Search for a Methodological Synthesis, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 605 (1976); Note, Efectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conifcts of Law: Party Auton-
omy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, which adopts the principal of party autonomy.
93. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 751 (the courts, by yielding to the parties' choice of law in
multistate transactions, will achieve uniformity arising from the ability of multistate con-
tractants to select the law that will govern their transactions in the full expectation that their
choice of law will be respected by whatever court might chance to hear their dispute); First Natl
Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263 (the rationale behind the rule that the parties to a contract have the
right to agree that their contract will be governed by the law of a particular state is to protect
the expectations of the parties and make it possible for them to foresee their rights and liabilities
under their contract); Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722. See Reese, supra note 77, at 22 (enforce-
ment of a choice of law clause provides the best means of assuring that the parties' expectations
will be satisfied). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e provides
that the prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the parties
and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities
under the contract.
94. First Natl Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263 (by allowing the parties to choose the law to
govern the validity of their contract and any resulting rights created thereunder, certainty and
predictability can be assured). See Reese, supra note 77, at 24 (giving effect to a choice-of-law
provision is the best and perhaps the only way of bringing certainty and predictability to the
field of choice of law in contracts); LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 302. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e.
95. See supra note 94.
96. WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 355-58.
97. 417 U.S. at 516. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 comment e
provides that the demands of certainty, predictability and convenience dictate that, subject to
some limitations, the parties should have power to choose the applicable law.
98. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750-51; WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 355 (contractual
parties may within reasonable limits choose the law to govern their contract).
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B. Limitations
1. Reasonable Relationship
The primary qualification on the general enforceability of choice of law
clauses is that the parties' transaction must bear a "reasonable relationship"
to the state whose law is stipulated to govern their agreement. 99 Although
the courts' terminology of this limitation may differ, 0 0 it is unanimously
held that the state whose law is stipulated to govern the contractual relation-
ship must have an interest in having its law applied. It is further held that
the parties cannot evade an otherwise applicable law by insertion of a choice
of law clause in their agreement. 10 ' In other words, there must be a real
connection between the state whose law is to be applied and the
transaction. 102
Although they apply the reasonable relationship requirement, the
courts have supplied few guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable rela-
tionship. Rather, such decision is made on a case-by-case basis. 13 Some of
the factors relied upon by the courts in making this determination are: the
parties principal place of business, place of incorporation, location of the
contracted property (real or intangible), place of performance, place of pay-
99. Although the courts' terminology differs with regard to this limitation, reference will be
made to "reasonable relationship" for reasons of simplicity and consistency.
100. Seaman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927) (the parties' choice
of law is limited only to the extent that it precludes them from selecting a jurisdiction which has
no normal relation to the transaction); Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 749-50 (although the forum
contacts with the transaction are the most significant, the determinative issue is whether there is
a reasonable relationship between the chosen law and the transaction so as to require the courts
to honor the parties' express choice of law to apply to their transaction); Boa.re, 437 F.2d at 530
(the court rejected the grouping-of-contacts theory as the test in determining the enforceability
of a choice of law clause which it held applied only to tort cases); Fuller Co., 421 F. Supp. at 942
(the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making
or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs); Potter & Brumftld, 410 F. Supp. at 1341
(most significant relationship test or governmental interest analysis).
It has been argued that where there is a reasonable basis for the parties' choice of law,
notwithstanding that the factual connection is lacking, such clause should be enforced. Exam-
ples of situations when this may arise is where the parties are contracting in countries whose
legal systems may be hostile, undeveloped or unfamiliar to the parties. See Weinberger, supra
note 92, at 613-16; WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 362. Although this position rarely finds sup-
port in the cases, the Supreme Court in Alberto-Culver reasoned that a choice of law provision in
a contract obviates the danger that a contract dispute might be submitted to a forum hostile to
the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved. 417 U.S. at 516.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment f provides that contracts are
entered into for serious purposes and rarely, if ever, will the parties choose a law without good
reason for doing so.
101. Seamen, 274 U.S. at 408; Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750. See E. SCOLES, & P. HAY, Supra
note 78, at 644.
102. Seaman, 274 U.S. at 408 (there must be a natural and vital connection with the transac-
tion); Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 753 (contacts between the transaction and the state whose law
was stipulated to govern the agreement must be real); First Nat'l Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263.
It has been contended that the choice of law clause in the parties' agreement is but one
factor to be considered in determining whether there exists a reasonable relationship between
the transaction and the state whose law was selected to govern the agreement. Potter & Brum-
flid, 410 F. Supp. at 1341; see Note, supra note 92, at 1677.
103. Fuller Co., 421 F. Supp. at 942 (the reasonable relationship criteria appears to constitute
a flexible standard which the courts apply on a case-by-case basis). See Prebble, supra note 77, at
502; Note, supra note 92, at 1682.
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ment, purpose of the contract and place of execution of the contract. 0 4
This analysis, predicated on a case-by-case basis, provides no stability to
the contractual relationship. Since there is no quorum of opinion this frus-
trates the predictability which the choice of law clauses were designed to
protect.
2. Fraud
The rules on fraud in both forum selection and choice of law clauses are
similar in that both require a showing of fraud in the inducement of the
clause itself, in order for it to be unenforceable. 10 5 If a court were to hold to
the contrary this would provide a loophole for the resisting party to circum-
vent the agreement by alleging that the contract is invalid by reason of
fraud. 106
3. Public Policy
The public policy limitation applicable to forum selection clauses is also
applicable to choice of law clauses.'0 7 This limitation was recognized in the
Supreme Court's decision of Laurtzen'0 8 where the Court held that except as
forbidden by some public policy the law to be applied in contract matters is
the law which the parties intended to apply.'0 9 This ruling has been the
foundation of other court opinions seeking to justify the confines of the pub-
lic policy. 1'0
The public policy limitation was defined as follows:
While the failure to enforce the parties' choice of law does invali-
date their contract to some extent, fulfillment of the parties' expec-
tations is not the only value in contract law; regard must also be
had for state interests and for state regulation. The chosen law
should not be applied without regard for the interests of the state
104. See Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 749; Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514; Fuller Co., 421 F.
Supp. at 943; Kronovet, 288 Md. at 45, 415 A.2d at 1104.
105. See Nakhleh v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 359 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Swanson v.
United-Greenfield Corp., 239 F. Supp. 299 (D. Conn. 1965); Freedman v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260, 401 N.Y.S.2d 176, 372 N.E.2d 12 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment c.
106. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
107. See Warren Bros. Co., 471 F.2d at 1307 n.3; Potter & Brumfwld, 410 F. Supp. at 1342;
Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271, 292-93 (W.D. Mo. 1973); American Eutectic
Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 353 F. Supp. 850, 855 (D.P.R.), rezod on other
grounds, 480 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1973); Goff v. Aamco Transmission, 313 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.
Md. 1970); Heede, Inc. v. West India Mach. and Supply Co.. 272 F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, . . ." See SCOLES, supra note 78, at 637-40; Prebble, supra note 77, at 509-
17; Reese, supra note 77, at 25 (the author contends that the more closely the state of the chosen
law is related to the contract and the parties, the more fundamental the policy must be for the
state of the otherwise applicable law to justify denying effect to the choice-of-law provision).
108. 345 U.S. 571. Although Lauritzen involved the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), the
court referred to conflict of law rules in contract matters.
109. See generally 345 U.S. at 588-89.
110. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980); Croft & Scully Co. v. M.V.
Skulptor Vuchetich, 508 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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which would be the state of the applicable law with respect to the
particular issue involved in the absence of an effective choice by
the parties. I1I
Thus, the circumvention of the parties' intentions may arise due to a strong
judicial or legislative policy.' 12
The elusiveness of this limitation is further demonstrated by the re-
quirement that the public policy must be fundamental in nature, in order to
hold the agreement providing for choice of law selection unenforceable."
13
This determination of what constitutes a fundamental policy is resolved by
the forum court."14 Initially, the court must ascertain the public policy of its
own state and if the public policy would not be violated then it must ascer-
tain the public policy of the state chosen pursuant to the agreement.' " 5 The
conjecture by the forum court regarding its own public policy and that of
the state stipulated involves a high degree of subjectivity which inevitably
produces further uncertainity in this area.
4. Adhesion Contracts
Choice of law clauses, similar to forum selection clauses, will not be
enforced where the contract involved is one of adhesion. 1 6 The adhesion
contract limitation is most frequently applied to insurance and usury agree-
ments which provide for a choice of law selection." t 7 These two types of
contracts are perceived by the courts as bastions of power: the party writing
111. 410 F. Supp. at 1343 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
comment g).
112. 410 F. Supp. at 1342.
U.C.C. § 1-105 (2) provides: "Where one of the . . . provisions of this Act specifies the
applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent
permitted by law (including the conflict of laws rules)."
113. 410 F. Supp. at 1341-42; 288 Md. at 47, 415 A.2d at 1106 (public policy held not to be
so fundamental to prevent application of another state's laws).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g illustrates the elu-
siveness of the public policy limitation by providing that although there is no precise definition
of what constitutes a "fundamental" policy it must in any event be a "substantial" policy. See
Prebble, supra note 77, at 512.
Although what constitutes a "fundamental" public policy remains undefined, it is gener-
ally agreed that simply because the chosen law differs in some respects from forum law it will
not be held to constitute a "fundamental" public policy. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 78, at 637-
38.
114. Unon Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 748; Delta AirLines, 503 F.2d at 243; Potter &Brumfltd, 410 F.
Supp. at 1341; Reese, supra note 77, at 25.
115. See supra note 114.
116. McQuillan v. "Italia" Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 386 F. Supp. 462, 467 n.l I
(S.D.N.Y 1974); Boase, 437 F.2d at 530-31. See supra note 42; LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 303;
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflicts of/Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075 (1953);
Prebble, supra note 77, at 514.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment b provides:
A choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual provision, will not be given effect
if the consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in the contract was secured by
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or mistake. . . . [T]he forum will scruti-
nize such contracts with care and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provision they
may contain if to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adherent.
117. See Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 749; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529-31; Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861,863-64 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.Polak, 312 F. Supp. 112, 116 (E.D.
Pa. 1969); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). SCOLES & HAY, SUpra
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the contract dictates terms to the individual consumer.' 18 Thus, it is seen as
effectively eliminating any arm's length bargaining between the parties over
the choice of law selection, which has led the courts to conclude that it is a
contract of adhesion.' 1 9 However, the courts draw a distinction when the
party resisting enforcement of the choice of law clause is a group as opposed
to an individual consumer. 120 The underlying rationale for this distinction
is that a group of employees or investors have the ability to receive conces-
sions from these otherwise unyielding institutions and therefore are not enti-
tled to avail themselves of this defense.
12 '
A choice of law clause will be unenforceable where there existed an ine-
quality of bargaining power by the parties at the time the contract was exe-
cuted. Although there is no definitive definition as to what constitutes
inadequate bargaining position, the case law indicates that a factor to be
considered is whether the party resisting enforcement is an individual or a
group.
5. Evasion of Law
This limitation addresses the scenario in which the parties have inserted
into their agreement a choice of law clause for the sole purpose of validating
their otherwise unenforceable actions. t 22 In such contracts the parties'
transaction lacks a normal connection with the state whose law was selected
or the contact did not occur in the normal course of the transaction.
123
Without a reasonable relationship or real contacts, the courts will hold that
the only reason for that choice of law was to evade the otherwise applicable
law and as such will render the clause unenforceable. 124 Much uncertainty
still clouds this limitation, because it is based on the court's subjective deter-
mination of whether "sufficient" contacts have been demonstrated.
6. Choice of Invalidating Law
Under this limitation, when the chosen law would frustrate the express
intention of the parties, the courts are split on whether to render the choice
note 78, at 641-42; see Paul & Plain, Choice of Law in Life Insurance Litigation, 6 A.B.A.F. 1, 3
(1970).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203(2) provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substan-
tial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.
18. See supra note 117.
119. Seesupra note 117.
120. Base, 437 F.2d at 529-30; Polak, 312 F. Supp. 1186.
121. See supra note 120; Paul & Plain, supra note 117.
122. See Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750.
123. See Seaman, 274 U.S. at 408; Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750.
[T]he parties' choice should be upheld unless the transaction lacks a normalconnection
with the state whose law was selected. Only when it is shown that the contact did not
occur in the normal course of the transaction, but was contrived to validate the par-
ties' choice of law, should the relationship be held unreasonable ...
642 F.2d at 751 (emphasis original) (quoting Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial
Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 625, 628).
124. See supra note 122.
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of law clause unenforceable based on mutual mistake or enforce the clause
under its own terms.' 25  A cornerstone of contract law is that contracts
should not be interpreted so as to frustrate the intention of the parties.
12 6
Another well-established axiom is that the courts do not make contracts for
the parties and therefore the parties' expressed intent must govern the inter-
pretation and application of the contract.127 A court's decision in this area is
uncertain because there are rules supporting both enforcement and
invalidation.
C. Summary
The choice of law clause is used by parties to a contract because of their
desire to be certain and confident of their rights under the state law stipu-
lated in the agreement. The parties understand when they execute the docu-
ment that their performance and disputes will be settled by the state's law as
set forth by the choice of law clause.
The problems addressed by the courts today in either upholding the
parties' agreement containing a choice of law clause or rendering it unen-
forceable depends on several different factors. The court must first deter-
mine whether the choice of law clause bears a reasonable relationship to the
transaction. This has been interpreted as meaning the state whose law is
agreed upon to govern the contract must have an interest in seeing its law
applied to the transaction and to prevent the parties from evading an other-
wise applicable law. If the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable state
interest and no evasion of another applicable state law, then it will sanction
the parties choice of law clause.
The reasonable relationship doctrine is viewed as undermining the cer-
tainty and confidence of the parties in their choice of law because the courts'
standard is subjective. Absence of predictability by the courts reduces the
certainty of such clauses now being drafted.
In addition to having sufficient state interest, the court also determines
whether the choice of law clause violates the areas of fraud, adhesion, eva-
sion of law and public policy. Except for public policy the other limitations
can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, but public policy is ex-
pressed by the composition of the court. Because public policy can be an
extremely nebulus concept, this further frustrates parties to a contract who
125. Kronove, 288 Md. at 46 n.18, 415 A.2d at 1105 n.18; Pisacane v. "Italia" Societa Per
Azione Di Navigazione, 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); General Electric Credit Corp. v.
Beyerlein, 55 Misc. 2d 724, 286 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Painton & Co., Ltd. v.
Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e provides:
On occasions, the parties may choose a law that would declare the contract inva-
lid. In such situations, the chosen law will not be applied by reason of the parties'
choice. To do so would defeat the expectations of the parties which it is the purpose of
the present rule to protect. . . . If the parties have chosen a law that would invalidate
the contract, it can be assumed that they did so by mistake.
Ste WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 358-60; Reese, supra note 77, at 25-26; Prebble, supra note 77,
at 627-30.
126. See Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 203 a (1979).
127. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 312 (1977).
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seek exactitude in the law that will control their legal relationship with other
parties.
In sum, the law is currently addressing the problem from a multitude of
approaches in search of a single standard. From these cases and treatises
hopefully there will emerge an objective doctrine which will enable parties
to contract in the belief their choice of law clause will be controlling between
themselves and will not be countermanded by the courts.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the enforceability of agreements providing for
choice of forum and choice of law selection. These two clauses have as their
goal to fulfill the expectations of the parties through predictability of the
courts. A review of the cases has indicated that the current decisions of the
courts have been neither definite nor consistent, thus frustrating the desires
of the contracting parties.
In a provision providing for choice of forum the controlling decision is
Bremen. This Supreme Court case held that parties can determine in ad-
vance their choice of forum. The reasons in favor of allowing choice of fo-
rum as annunciated by the court were to promote expansion of business,
freedom of contract, predictability, and expectation of the parties, and that
the clause is part of the bargained for agreement.
Since this landmark decision the positive attributes which were to inure
to the contracting parties have been eroded by such elusive classifications as
fraud, adhesion, statutory restrictions and the ever mercurial public policy.
Under the guise of these subjective standards the ability of contracting par-
ties to control their legal relationship has been stripped from them and is
now possessed by the courts. This intermeddling by the judicial process
without clearly defined standards has left contracting parties both disap-
pointed and uncertain as to how to proceed with an agreement that the
courts will interpret and uphold to fulfill their expectations.
With respect to provisions setting forth a choice of law clause, the courts
have scrutinized it in much the same manner as has been done with choice of
forum clauses. The courts in construing a provision providing for choice of
law first apply the reasonable relationship test. If the provision passes, then
it must also not suffer from fraud, adhesion, evasion of law or public policy.
The court's subjectivity in this area has produced the same results as in the
choice of forum clauses, with the consequence that contracting parties are
uncertain whether the clause will be able to perform the function for which
it was designed.
The courts and treatises must both refrain from supplying complex and
confusing doctrines which thwart the objectives which were designed to be
met by the mechanisms of choice of forum and choice of law selection. It is
time for a re-examination of the varying standards in light of the ideals of
clarity of law, predictability of result, and furtherance of economic activity.
In an era of ever-increasing contracting by these parties these objectives need
to be interpreted by a standard which is both objective and fair; whereby,
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contracting parties are able to be confident and certain that they control
their interactions with other parties.
